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ABSTRACT In the 1960s, U.S. physical anthropology underwent a period of introspection that marked a change from the old physi-
cal anthropology that was largely race based to the new physical anthropology, espoused by Washburn and others for over a decade,
which incorporated the evolutionary biology of the modern synthesis. What actually changed? What elements of the race concept have
been rejected, and what elements have persisted, influencing physical anthropology today? In this article, I examine both the scientific
and social influences on physical anthropology that caused changes in the race concept, in particular the influence of the American
Anthropological Association. The race concept is complicated but entails three attributes: essentialism, cladistic thinking, and biologi-
cal determinism. These attributes have not all been discarded; while biological determinism and its social implications have been ques-
tioned since the inception of the field, essentialism and the concomitant rendering of populations as clades persists as a legacy of the
race concept. [Keywords: race, essentialism, physical anthropology]
THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE PUBLICATION ofCarleton Coon's The Origin of Races in 1962 reflect-
ed a major change in U.S. physical anthropology. Coon
suggested that five major races of humans evolved in par-
allel from Homo erectus at five different times and at differ-
ent rates. He further suggested that each racial lineage
crossed the sapiens "threshold" at different times in pre-
history and implied that the length of time each had been
in the sapiens state was correlated with the level of "cul-
tural achievement" of different racial groups. Coon con-
tended that Causcasoids and Mongoloids crossed this
threshold considerably earlier than Africans (Negroids and
Capoids) and Australians (Australoids), a claim that clearly
had social implications.
Race had held immense importance within the field
of physical anthropology during the time leading up to
the publication of Coon's work. At the emergence of the
subdiscipline, race was the major theoretical foundation
of anthropology; physical anthropology was virtually syn-
onymous with the study of race. In 1902, at the inception
of the American Anthropological Association (AAA), most
anthropologists considered "race" to represent the way
the human species was internally subdivided. Essentialism
was implicit in this idea; a race was thought to represent a
natural category with unique features that defined the es-
sence of that category.1 It seemed obvious to many anthro-
pologists that these biological subdivisions corresponded
to the social meanings of race, a notion that linked physi-
cal and behavioral characteristics. This link between the
components of an essence provided the basis for the bio-
logical determinism prevalent in the racial thinking of the
time. Throughout the 20th century, race also had an evo-
lutionary component. Races were effectively thought of as
clades. Different essences were explained as a product of
poorly understood evolutionary processes, as exemplified
by Coon's notion of independently evolving racial lineages.
The discourse Coon's book spawned contributed to
currents within the field that ultimately forced an end to
the old physical anthropology centered mainly on the
race concept and helped usher in the new physical anthro-
pology, espoused by Sherry Washburn, which had been
developing throughout the 1950s. The new anthropology
was eclectic (incorporating various subjects from primates
to genetics) and was an evolutionary science, whose popu-
lational approaches were incompatible with the essential-
ism central to the race concept. The Origin of Races brought
to a head the rifts within physical anthropology as a disci-
pline, the tensions between the subdisciplines of anthro-
pology, and discussions about the role of anthropology in
the public arena.
The AAA's reaction to the book was decisive. Washburn,
then president of the association, delivered a scathing
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address denouncing the book around the time of its publi-
cation at the AAA Annual Meeting in Chicago on Novem-
ber 16, 1962. The published version (Washburn 1963) is
much less harsh, focusing on the limited use of race as a
valid object of study and the lack of scientific support for
any claims of racial inferiority. Public denunciation of
Coon's ideas seemed necessary; segregationists were al-
ready using them to bolster their arguments. There were a
variety of responses from the scientific community. State-
ments on race were issued by both the AAA and the Ameri-
can Association of Physical Anthropologists (AAPA). Sev-
eral edited volumes appeared throughout the 1960s
critiquing the race concept. In 1966, Margaret Mead and
Theodosius Dobzhansky organized an American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) symposium
meant to deliver the scientific voice against a popular ra-
cism based on "misinformation" and "evil myths" about
race. As embodied by its organizers, the symposium repre-
sented an alliance between Boasian cultural anthropology
and evolutionary biology, including diverse perspectives
from within anthropology, genetics, ethnology, psychol-
ogy, and sociology. With few exceptions, most anthro-
pologists had become opposed to hereditarian claims
about race and intelligence, and many were now skeptical
of the race concept itself. What became clear by the mid-
1960s was that race was no longer a unifying concept in
mainstream physical anthropology, just as it had ceased to
be a unifying concept for anthropology as a whole since
Boas's work on race a half century earlier. In physical an-
thropology, race was now a divisive concept. Although
Washburn had published his ideas about the new anthro-
pology earlier, this period marked a turning point in the
discipline, with greater institutional introspection on the
race concept. Some have even argued that it marked the
demise of the race concept.
Several factors influenced changing views about race
within physical anthropology during this time. First, so-
cial factors prompted scientists to challenge assumptions
of biological determinism and intellectual inferiority asso-
ciated with the race concept. The Holocaust in the 1930s
and 1940s and the controversy surrounding school deseg-
regation in the early 1960s may have been the most im-
portant examples. Another component of social pressure
resulted from the relationship between anthropology and
governmental interest in race and racial inequality, an in-
terest that had promoted the "racialization" of U.S. an-
thropology in the first place. Second, the race concept it-
self was challenged by the populational principles espoused
in the modern synthesis; evolutionary ideas were incom-
patible with the essentialist foundations of the race con-
cept, and alternative views of population and clines, based
largely on understandings from population genetics, led
many scholars to consider race an invalid tool for under-
standing biological variation. Finally, the evolution of U.S.
physical anthropology, from its emergence as a subfield to
the present day, has been influenced by its relationship
with the rest of anthropology—specifically, four-field an-
thropology as embodied by the AAA. It is interesting that
as early as 1894, a quarter century prior to the emergence
of physical anthropology as a true subdiscipline,*Boas be-
gan to challenge the race concept. By the time physical
anthropology clearly emerged in the 1920s, Boas's follow-
ers held some of the most powerful positions within U.S.
anthropology and were a dominant voice in the AAA.
Therefore, the racial physical anthropology that was re-
jected in the 1960s developed within a broader anthropo-
logical context that had been grappling with the race con-
cept for years; parts of that community already questioned
race, and the AAA had been involved in struggles over the
issue of race between anthropology and government poli-
cies and funding, as well as struggles between anthropol-
ogy and other sciences. The rejection of race in the 1960s
was not so new; it was a part of the heritage of physical an-
thropology within U.S. anthropology.
This history suggests that the race concept has no re-
maining legacy in physical anthropology. What actually
changed? Is the race concept really dead? What elements
of the race concept still persist and influence physical an-
thropology today? In this article, I address these questions,
investigating them within the context of the scientific and
social influences on mainstream physical anthropology
that were a major force in the evolution of the race con-
cept. I argue that some elements of the race concept were
in fact rejected, but that others remain, subtly influencing
our views of what we today term "populations."
THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE RACE CONCEPT
The race concept that was examined and rejected by so
many in the 1960s includes assumptions about the cause
and nature of geographic and other kinds of variation. The
history behind these assumptions has helped create the
concept that we grapple with today. Although for the last
100 years the race concept has been thought about in
quasi-evolutionary terms, its most fundamental elements
are essentialism, clades, and biological determinism. These
attributes are clearly related, and all of them have in-
formed the theories about human variation in physical
anthropology. The race concept has changed, yet these at-
tributes of race have not all changed together. While bio-
logical determinism and its social implications have been
questioned since the inception of the field, essentialism
and the concomitant rendering of races as clades have
been less amenable to change.
Essentialism
The races defined by the Western race concept were codi-
fied by Linnaeus (1758) and by the definitive 10th edition
of Systemae Naturae, in which he described five subspecies
of humans, listing for each type both the morphological
and behavioral characteristics that were considered a part
of the essence of the category. These were implicitly (and
explicitly) understood to be part of the intrinsic biology of
the race. European prejudices were clearly incorporated
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into Linnaean typologies and taxonomies integral to the
natural history tradition. From its very inception, the race
concept embodied both essentialism and biological deter-
minism.
In many cases this essentialism (and the natural his-
tory context to which it applied) rendered thinking about
race very similar to thinking about biological species. This
is exemplified in the polygenism so prevalent in the U.S.
and French schools of thought that dominated much of
anthropology for the first half of the 19th century (Brace
1982; Stanton 1960; Stocking 1968; Wolpoff and Caspari
1997).
Even after the widespread acceptance of evolution
and many elements of Darwinian theory, a form of poly-
genism continued to thrive because evolutionary scientists
retained an essentialist (and racial) perspective. Taxo-
nomic categories, including subspecific ones, continued to
be conceptualized as discrete groups, while the essences of
the categories were explained as products of separate evo-
lutionary histories. Races, like species categories, were de-
picted as branches on an evolutionary tree, whose differ-
ences could now be explained through their independent
evolution, at different rates.
Clades: Evolutionary Essentialism
Conforming to the Darwinian notion of the common de-
scent of all species, tree models became appropriate models
for diagramming the relationships between species. After
splitting from a common ancestor, two daughter species
are reproductively isolated by definition and represent dif-
ferent branches of a phylogeny. Therefore, intuitive essen-
tialism and older tree metaphors did not impede under-
standing of evolutionary processes at the species level,
because the categories are discrete. However, the story is
quite different below the species level, because branching
cannot accurately reflect relationships between groups
that exchange genes.
The essentialist link between depicting variation be-
tween species and variation within the human species was
nowhere clearer or more influential than in the works of
Ernst Haeckel. Haeckel used evolutionary trees both to de-
scribe the place of humans in the natural world and the re-
lationships of human iaces within the human species.
This had unfortunate implications for understandings of
human variation. As Linnaean taxonomy was "evolution-
ized" and relationships among taxa expressed in terms of
evolutionary trees, human races, like species, became
branches (or twigs) on the tree, each with its own defin-
able essence. This approach provided scientific explana-
tions for human differences; human groups were effec-
tively species on a smaller scale, whose differences could
be accounted for through independent evolution.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the use of
phylogenies to characterize human relationships in so-
ciopolitical spheres provided the conceptual underpin-
nings of Western racial classifications. They provided jus-
tification for "interracial competition" (Keith 1936), the
basis for claims of the biological inferiority of social classes,
and supported unjust social institutions ranging from slavery
to various eugenic policies and the applied biology of
Nazism (Gasman 1971; Stein 1988; Wolpoff and Caspari
1997).
The assumption of monophyly implicit in tree meta-
phors was made explicit with the general concensus that
tree branches are clades, defined as monophyletic groups.
A monophyletic group includes an ancestral taxon and all
its descendents; clearly, races are not monophyletic and
their depiction as clades is inappropriate. Yet tree branches
are the underlying representation of race as a natural cate-
gory, and of the evolutionary relationships between races.
This construction underlies much of the thinking present
throughout the history of U.S. physical anthropology.
Biological Determinism
Biological determinism is implicit to the race concept, and
it is this component that has been most ardently ad-
dressed by the field because of its obvious social implica-
tions. In the 1960s, biological determinism was a focal
point of important current issues (in particular, school de-
segregation in the South), and it was because this attribute
was at the center of political discussions that many in the
anthropological community of the 1960s found it impor-
tant to address.
Nineteenth-century anthropology embodied both a
racial thinking and evolutionism that explained cultural
variation. At the Turn of the Century, virtually all social
scientists were evolutionists, holding the idea that primi-
tive races and their cultures represented stages in evolu-
tionary history or branches of different lengths on an evo-
lutionary tree. Different scholars tied biology and culture
together in different ways: some were more deterministic
than others, some saw biology as influencing cultural
change, others like Lewis Henry Morgan (1877, reprinted
in 1964), for example, thought culture affected biological
change in the brain, in a Lamarckian sense. However, biol-
ogy was usually considered the determinant of cultural dif-
ferences. Anthropology, as it was practiced throughout
much of the 19th century, was a single biocultural disci-
pline, with race linking the components. Fianz Boas sev-
ered this connection for U.S. anthropology, and while not
all anthropologists agreed with him, he and his followers
forced a kind of introspection—biological (racial) determi-
nism of cultural differences could no longer be accepted as
a blanket assumption in U.S. anthropology.
Biological determinism is not a necessary part of racial
typologies and can be rejected without the rejection of the
race concept as a whole. Throughout the history of the AAA,
many anthropologists questioned the validity of racial
determination of cultural capacities without completely re-
jecting the race concept and its underlying essentialism.
Nevertheless, in general, the biological determinism of the
race concept was deeply entrenched in anthropology as a
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major assumption of racial studies, and in Europe, racial
anthropology was a major component of anthropological
thought.
U.S. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF
THEAAA
In the United States, ironically, given the influence of the
earlier "American School/' race had become somewhat
less important than in European anthropology. Because of
its emergence within (or in some cases beside) the broader
anthropological tradition embodied after 1902 by the
AAA, physical anthropology always represented more of a
struggle between racial (i.e., those who focused on race)
and nonracial elements—or should I say "less-racial" ele-
ments, because the race concept really underlay all think-
ing about human variation. To some extent, the new
physical anthropology espoused by Washburn represented
a realliance with the Boasian parts of anthropology that
had questioned the assumptions of the race concept since
the 1890s.
Boas
The story of race in U.S. anthropology (including physical
anthropology) cannot be discussed without reviewing the
role of Boas and the AAA. This has been treated by a large
number of Boas scholars (to name a few: Cole 1999; Stock-
ing 1968; Williams 1996), and I only briefly outline these
relationships here to underscore the professional and po-
litical tensions affecting physical anthropology as it emerged
as a subdiscipline.
Until the 1920s, there were really no U.S. degrees
awarded in what would be specifically considered "physi-
cal anthropology." Nevertheless, race and racial assump-
tions still played an important, if secondary, role in anthro-
pology. The field focused on Native American ethnology
and archaeology and was descriptive; therefore, even while
race may have been considered a cause of cultural vari-
ation, it was not emphasized. The pre-Darwinian polygenist
American School of Samuel Morton had no students, and al-
though the polygenist zoologist Louis Agassiz produced
Fredrick Ward Putnam, who had a fundamental influence
on the development of anthropology in the United States,
Putnam's interest was archaeology, not race.
As anthropology emerged as a profession at the Turn
of the Century, a commitment to Native American studies
and the idea of professionalization (i.e., training in anthro-
pology rather than related disciplines, or worse, none at all)
was what held the early association together, in spite of
early divisions between the "Washingtonians" and "Boas-
ians" along this very line (Stocking 1968). Boas was re-
sponsible for the four-field training of many early Ph.D.s
in VS. anthropology, even those from outside his home
institution (Columbia). Unlike the European model for
anthropology, Boas thought training in anthropology
should include all subdisciplines, as did his own research.
At Harvard, Putnam concentrated on archeology, the fo-
cus of most of the 15 Ph.D.s Harvard produced between
1894-1919. Yet, many of these students also trained under
Boas in ethnology, linguistics, and physical anthropology
(Cole 1999). Boas was instrumental in the training of Har-
vard students such as Roland Dixon (who was later to be-
come an influence on Earnest Hooton's racial thinking) as
well as his own famous descendents from Columbia. By
1926, Boas's students (or sympathizers) would head every
major department in the country (Stocking 1968).
It is sometimes forgotten that Boas was a practicing
physical anthropologist early in his career, probably the
only one training students in the United States at the Turn
of the Century. In 1894, Paul Topinard (the preeminent
French anthropologist of his time, and student of Broca)
wrote that Boas was "the man, the anthropologist, I
wished for in the United States" (Stocking 1968:166).
Boas received his Ph.D. in physics in 1881 but by that
time had become a geographer. Previously untrained in
anthropology, he sought guidance from Adolph Bastian in
ethnology and Rudolph Virchow in physical anthropol-
ogy before leaving Berlin for Baffin Island. Boas much ad-
mired Virchow, who trained him in anthropometries (Cole
1999; Stocking 1968). Like Virchow, Boas was interested in
physiological processes and never became a Darwinian
(i.e., selectionist), although he did recognize common de-
scent and human evolutionary relationships to the natural
world. Like many others of his time, Boas had Lamarckian
ideas (see Wolpoff and Caspari 1997: ch. 8) and never un-
derstood selection. He accepted the view of many German
scientists that selection could only effect small changes
(Kinkerlitzchen, as Franz Weidenreich called them), not
large ones. Moreover, and, perhaps, more importantly,
Boas considered Virchow's most significant legacy to be
the organization of the field in Germany, and, later, Boas
consciously sought to be a similar figure in U.S. anthropol-
ogy (Stocking 1968).
In the United States, Boas continued to make contri-
butions to physical anthropology, which he recognized, as
did everyone at the time, as racial studies. However, in-
stead of accepting the assumptions of the race concept, he
treated them as objects of inquiry. He wound up rejecting
biological determinism rather early in the game, and,
later, his work questioned the validity of human types,
thus challenging the essentialism at the core of the race
concept. However, he never really relinquished essentialist
notions of major races—broad geographic entities—even
as he questioned the validity of human types for smaller
racial categories, such as various nationalities (e.g., "Nor-
dics" or "Alpines").
His strongest contributions to physical anthropology
were statistical, which he applied to studies of metric human
variation. He was very interested in the new biometrics
being advanced by Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, with
whom he corresponded, and he developed his own meth-
ods of analysis as well. A major outcome of these studies
was his appreciation of the importance of variation, which
. he used later to critique the idea of racial types. This can
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be juxtaposed with Hooton's use of Pearson's biometrics
years later, which he used less critically to delineate racial
types. Hooton influenced the development of a race-based
physical anthropology in the United States; Boas and his
legacy contributed to its demise.
By the time Boas came to Columbia in 1896, he was
deeply concerned with questions of race and had re-
searched problems of variation and change. He was al-
ready developing his ideas of relativism, sparked by his
1884 expedition to Baffin Island, and by then had largely
rejected the idea that race determined cultural achieve-
ment. As early as 1894, he explicitly rejected racial deter-
minism of culture: "Historical events appear to have been
much more potent in leading races to civilization than
their faculty, and it follows that achievements of races do
not warrant us to assume that one race is more highly
gifted than another" (Boas 1894:303).
He thought physical anthropology was important in
understanding historical relationships among peoples, but
even accepting races as "real," he recognized the impor-
tance of environment and history as influences on human
biology and behavior. Boas was interested in growth and
development as a critical part of physical anthropology,
especially the conditions (environmental and hereditary
affects on growth) that influenced the modification of in-
herited form. Prior to moving to Columbia in 1896, he in-
itiated a study of Worcester schoolchildren in which he
statistically demonstrated the problems with inferring
longitudinal information from cross-sectional studies
(and, thus, advocated for longitudinal studies in growth)
and emphasized for the first time the importance of vari-
ation in tempos of growth. Thus, before the Turn of the
Century, he was looking at human variation in nonracial
ways, more interested in the impact of the environment
(including culture) on biology than the affect of biology
(race) on culture.
Boas investigated American Indian racial issues for the
British Association for the Advancement of Science. He
looked for relationships between heredity and environ-
ment underlying physical differences between reservation
and nonreservation-dwelling Indians of the North Pacific
Coast. He also looked at problems of racial admixture in
"half-blood" Indians, rejecting polygenist assumptions of
reduced fertility in racial hybrids. In these "mixed" popu-
lations, he also examined variation in cranial proportions,
including facial breadths—where he noted the distribu-
tion was bimodal and not normal. In these and other stud-
ies, averages did not represent the "type." He later under-
mined the concept of "type," questioning its meaning: If
averages did not represent the "type," what did? What was
of interest was the distribution of traits, not the conforma-
tion to types or the creation of new, intermediate types in
the case of interbreeding that was critical to the race con-
cept. His most famous work regarding race was performed
between 1908-10 on head shape in U.S. immigrants,
funded (somewhat ironically) by the U.S. Immigration
Commission, which was seeking a scientific basis to re-
strict immigration. In a study of over 18,000 immigrants,
he found changes in head form that undermined the
dogma of the stability of racial types and the European fo-
cus on head shape as a major indicator of race. He could
not explain the causes of change, although he considered
them in some way "environmental" and, as an empiricist,
argued that what was important was the documentation
of the change itself. Through his work on racial questions,
Boas challenged both biological determinism and the na-
ture of racial categories, two critical components of the
race concept. These challenges were a central part of an-
thropological thinking in the U.S. before Hooton started
producing Ph.D.s in physical anthropology.
"Racializing" Physical Anthropology
Both governmental and private forces promoted the ren-
aissance of the "science of race" in U.S. anthropology dur-
ing World War I, running counter to the traditions devel-
oping in much of U.S. anthropology. However, there were
also tensions between Boasians and other, at the time,
smaller factions of the AAA who were sympathetic to the
anthropologists associated with Washington institutions
(Stocking 1968). It must be remembered that until Hooton
started producing Ph.D.s at Harvard in 1925, there was no
specific training in physical anthropology in the United
States. Only six U.S. Ph.D.s in physical anthropology had
been awarded prior to 1925—five of these from Harvard,
trained by specialists in other disciplines. Ales Hrdlicka,
the founder of American Journal of Physical Anthropology in
1918, and AAPA in 1928, had no students in his position
at the National Museum of Natural History.
During the second decade of the 20th century, many
scholars who claimed to represent physical anthropology
were actually eugenicists from other disciplines (that
claimed scientific superiority to anthropology), and some
were very powerful in the U.S. scientific political structure.
These included members of the Galton Society, which was
dedicated to the study of racial anthropology, such as the
paleontologist Henry Fairfield Osborn (then president of
the American Museum of Natural History), and the biolo-
gists Raymond Pearl and John C. Merriman (head of the
National Research Council [NRC]). Many in the anthropo-
logical community saw them as a threat; they were racial
determinists with a political agenda, and the Boasian-
dominated AAA did not accept them as anthropologists.
There was clearly a need for physical anthropologists
trained within anthropology. This dearth became very ap-
parent when the National Research Council sought to form
an anthropology committee, which was to deal with physi-
cal anthropology and eugenics. Aside from Hrdlicka and
Boas, there were few physical anthropologists recognized
by the AAA to serve (Stocking 1968). Madison Grant and
Charles Davenport, ardent racists and eugenicists, foun-
ders of the Galton Society with strong political agendas
and ties to Washington, served on the original committee.
While the AAA refused to recognize Grant or Davenport as
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anthropologists, there remained enormous pressure on an-
thropology to "racialize," both from the government,
which had become increasingly interested in restricting
immigration on racial grounds, and from the eugenic in-
terests controlling other major funding sources. Members
of the Galton Society included the heads of institutions
that had been (or potentially could be) important sources
of anthropological funding. By the 1920s, funding in-
creased for studies of race and racial psychology. U.S. an-
thropologists responded to this funding increase and to
criticisms that they neglected biology and the racial
makeup of the U.S. by expressing more interest in physical
anthropology. Ironically, several of Boas's students (e.g.,
Mead, Herskovitz, Klineberg) were funded by NRC fellow-
ships in the biological sciences for work that supported
the cultural basis for racial differences, and Boas himself
exploited these sources for his own work on race. Other
students of Boas, such as Alfred E. Kroeber (and Roland
Dixon), as well as more conservative non-Boasian ele-
ments of the anthropological community, also became
more interested in physical anthropology, placing the race
concept and eugenics at the focus of the emerging new
physical anthropology.
Hooton
Earnest Hooton was one of the most influential figures in
physical anthropology (Giles 1999). He was a professor at
Harvard from 1913 until his death in 1954 and was re-
sponsible for training virtually an entire academic field,
spawning several generations of students when few other
universities offered physical anthropology as part of their
curricula. Hooton's Ph.D. (in 1911 from Wisconsin) was in
classics. He had little background in anthropology, and it
took some time to get his program off the ground, but
starting in 1926, a flood of Ph.D.s in physical anthropol-
ogy emerged from Harvard. Within a few years, physical
anthropology was a major part of U.S. anthropology, and
this was reflected in AAA membership and the develop-
ment of the AAPA.
Race studies came to be the focus of Hooton's career,
but he formed his ideas about race and physical anthro-
pology in general after he came to Harvard. His work was
typological and manifested, like Haeckel's, as an "evolu-
tionary polygenism" (Wolpoff and Caspari 1997). Hooton's
Harvard colleague, Dixon, influenced his views on race;
Hooton's 1931 classification is very similar to Dixon's 1923
classification.
The polygenism of Hooton and Dixon was compli-
cated, grounded in the belief in once-pure races that had
separate evolutionary histories. Like many other scientists
with fundamentally polygenist ideas, they understood
that present human variation could not be accommodated
within a few racial types. Hooton thought that the com-
plexity of human variation could be accounted for
through interbreeding between once-pure primary racial
groups that relatively recently underwent a secondary race
formation stage and then a tertiary stage—in each stage,
hybrid races formed from the preexisting ones. Thus, they
argued, pure races existed and persisted into the present,
but secondary and tertiary races formed more recently in
human evolution through hybridization. Hooton's views
were still essentialist; he believed in "pure" races, but he
realized that a few racial types could not account for real
observable variation.
Hooton's thinking about race had all the attributes of
the race concept; he was an essentialist, he explained the
essence with evolutionary branches, and he was a biologi-
cal determinist as is clearly shown in his eugenic writing
(Hooton 1937, 1939; Wolpoff and Caspari 1997). Given
this, Hooton's views on racism could appear paradoxical
(Wolpoff and Caspari 1997). While he believed in races,
and even in "racial character," he was more active than
most members of the academic community in antiracist
activities, entering into a relationship with Boas that
Barkan termed "the frustrated antiracist campaign of an
odd anthropological couple" (1988:182). After many at-
tempts to mobilize the academic community against ra-
cism, Boas turned to Hooton, who sent a statement he had
authored to seven leading U.S. physical anthropologists
outlining his view on the state of scientific knowledge of
race differences. Among other things, he concluded that a
correlation between physical features and mental ability
had not been demonstrated and that there was insuffi-
cient scientific evidence to assign evolutionary ranks to
races. Only Hrdlicka would sign it. In 1936, Hooton then
published his own "Plain Statement about Race" in Sci-
ence, speaking against the racism underlying Nazism. In
1940, as Hooton realized the futility of attempts to organ-
ize even the AAPA against racism, his student William W.
Howells asked him what could be done. He replied: "Not
only has the horse been stolen, but the barn has also been
burnt" (Barkan 1988:203).
It is hard to overestimate the importance of Hooton to
U.S. physical anthropology. Hooton's thinking on race was
adopted by some of his students, rejected by others, but in
either case, it strongly influenced subsequent generations
of scholars because it limited their understanding of differ-
ent ways of interpreting intergroup relationships. Even
students such as Howells, who largely rejected Hooton's
polygenism, inherited essentialist views (Caspari and Wolpoff
1996; Wolpoff and Caspari 1997). For instance, Howells
was so conditioned by polygenic models that he did not
interpret Franz Weidenreich's polycentric model of hu-
man evolution as a network, as it was originally presented
(Weidenreich 1946). Following an initial exchange in the
American Anthropologist (AA) (Howells 1942; Weidenreich
1940), Howells described Weidenreich's ideas as a poly-
genic tree (the "candelabra"). Even after diagrams of the
trellis appeared (Weidenreich 1946, 1947), Howells con-
tinued to depict it as a candelabra in numerous secondary
sources and textbooks throughout his career (e.g., Howells
1959,1993). It may be that Howells was in part reacting to the
polygenism of R. Ruggles Gates, a racist plant geneticist
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who derived support from both Hooton and Coon, thinking
Weidenreich shared these views (Gates 1944; Wolpoff and
Caspari 1997). But Weidenreich (1946) specifically disavowed
Gates's polygenism, and the candelabra Howells described
was actually more like Hooton's model, and not Weiden-
reich's. "Tree-thinking" permeated physical anthropology;
like HowelTs depiction of Weidenreich's trellis, most scholars
saw the "candelabra" as a reasonable simplification (perhaps
an oversimplification) of a trellis, but one that represented
the same processes. Depictions of gene flow were ignored—a
legacy of the race concept.
Nevertheless, although very influential, Hooton's brand
of race science did not permeate physical anthropology in
the United States for long. It was never the overwhelming
tradition that it had been in Europe, and his students,
only a single generation later, were responsible for the
new physical anthropology that disavowed the impor-
tance of race. Washburn, the most well-known among
these, actively rejected the racial thinking of his mentor; it
is not surprising that Washburn's first job was at Colum-
bia, where he joined those predominantly influenced by
the Boasians, including Ashley Montagu.
While few of his students shared Hooton's eugenic
fervor, many of them continued his focus on race and hu-
man variation, at least for a while. Some, such as Stanley
Garn and Coon, focused on problems of race definition,
the number of different races, and problems of race forma-
tion (e.g., Brues 1972; Coon et al. 1950; Garn 1957, 1962).
These researchers and many others contributed to discus-
sions about the number of races—some recognized hun-
dreds, some only a few. Authors such as Coon et al. (1950)
suggested it was just a matter of resolution: Microraces
could be defined by a larger number of traits and repre-
sented subdivisions of broad major races whose constitu-
ents uniquely shared a smaller number of traits. Some of
these studies implied the arbitrary nature of racial classifi-
cation. Coon et al. (1950) wrote on the potential adaptive
significance of racial traits. Harry Shapiro (1939) and Fred
Hulse (1962), also students of Hooton and interested in
questioning the stability of racial traits, demonstrated dra-
matic morphological changes in first-generation Japanese
immigrants in Hawaii, similar to Boas's conclusions earlier
in the 20th century. Some students, such as William Shel-
don in his famous somatotype studies, retained Hooton's
biological determinism (and in Sheldon's case expanded
on it); others, such as Coon, inherited Hooton's poly-
genism; still others, such as Washburn, rejected Hooton's
emphasis on race, turning instead to the evolutionary
ideas underlying the modern synthesis as the foundation
of the new physical anthropology.
With the modern synthesis of the 1940s, Hooton's
students also faced the need to bring evolutionary theory
into their studies. They did this in different ways. Coon
was a typologist who never incorporated populational
thinking into his perspective; however, he considered
himself an evolutionist, largely through his interest in ad-
aptation. He did not extend this to an understanding of
populational processes, a focus on variation within popu-
lations, or on the fluidity of populations (Wolpoff and
Caspari 1997). The new physical anthropology came to be
viewed as the study of human evolution, not the descrip-
tion of human types. Some, like Frederick Hulse, ad-
dressed this by looking at races as evolutionary episodes,
viewing races as largely ephemeral, caused by evolutionary
processes. Washburn sought to develop a new physical an-
thropology without race, grounded in evolutionary biol-
ogy and the populational thinking of the synthesis. Only
three years after the Princeton symposium that marked
the "official" birth of the modern synthesis, Washburn
and Dobzhansky organized the famous 15th Annual Cold
Spring Harbor Symposium that clarified the evolutionary
program of the new physical anthropology. In addition to
a focus on human evolution and prehistory, the new
physical anthropology espoused ways that biology was
relevant to studies of the human condition—that biology
and culture could be interrelated without determinism. A
new generation of physical anthropologists studied "popula-
tions" instead of "races," or studied the distribution of in-
dividual traits in clinal studies (Brace 1964).
Ironically, Hooton himself contributed to the chang-
ing focus of physical anthropology through his skills as an
educator and his respect for his students (Giles 1999). As
Harry Shapiro points out in Hooton's obituary in the AA,
Hooton encouraged diversity of thought in his students.
He did not want to establish a "school" and "never at-
tempted to establish intellectual ascendancy over his stu-
dents" (1954:1082). He encouraged dissenting opinions,
telling Shapiro: "You know, none of my students have
been yes men. . . . Thank God!" (Shapiro 1954:1082). Hoo-
ton's students remained diverse, as they established physi-
cal anthropology in universities and museums around the
country. Some maintained the polygenism and racial ap-
proaches of their advisor, while others were responsible, at
least in part, for what has been considered the demise of
the race concept.
THE DEMISE OF THE RACE CONCEPT?
Public Science
The very public rejection of race by many anthropologists
in the 1960s was one of a number of responses, beginning
in the 1930s, by the scientific community to racism in the
larger society. Furthermore, thinking about the race con-
cept itself had evolved with the development of the mod-
ern synthesis in biology, and the application of its princi-
ples to human variation and evolution (not only by
anthropologists but also by the architects of the synthesis
itself). Indeed, several of its architects, especially Ernst
Mayr (1982, 1991) and Dobzhansky (1944, 1962, 1963)
saw the populational thinking of the synthesis and emerg-
ing understandings of population genetics to be influential
weapons in a war waged by science against public racism.
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However, the reaction sparked by Coon's publication of
The Origin of Races was also a response to Coon's tacit alli-
ance with racists seeking to influence public policy (Jack-
son 2001).
Some anthropologists, as well as other scientists, had
been active in antiracism campaigns since the early 1930s.
The abuses of biology and anthropology that were at the
root of the eugenics movement and Nazi biopolicy pro-
pelled at least a few biologists, anthropologists, and evolu-
tionists with a sense of responsibility to present scientific
arguments that would undermine this "scientific" racism.
This is when Boas and Hooton formed their fruitless coali-
tion to generate support for an antiracist campaign within
U.S. academia. The British evolutionary biologist J. B. S.
Haldane spoke out against racism at the 1934 London
Meeting of the International Congress of Anthropological
and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES), warning his audience
against the abuse of science in support of race theories. In
1935, responding to rising racism in Europe, Julian Huxley
and Alfred Haddon published We Europeans, an important
antiracist tract. In addition to undermining biological de-
terminism and assumptions of racial inferiority, they
questioned the very existence of race and suggested that
ethnic group replace the term race, a harbinger of Ashley
Montagu's 1942 Man's Most Dangerous Myth and his 1950
UNESCO statement on race.
Montagu, who received his Ph.D. with Boas at Colum-
bia after studying anatomy with G. Elliot Smith in Lon-
don, was the U.S. physical anthropologist at the forefront
of the public antiracism campaign after the war. He
authored numerous popular articles and books, as well as
the first UNESCO statement on race, which was very con-
troversial because of his claim that races were a "myth,"
not because of his denunciation of notions of differences
in racial capacities for achievement.
In the 1960s, an even larger group of scientists sought
to undermine the scientific racism used to support oppo-
nents of the civil rights movement. This reaction was es-
pecially strong in the anthropological community. Once
again, as in the days of Madison Grant and other times
throughout its history, the AAA found itself pitted against
groups seeking to influence public racial policy in the
name of science. Carleton Putnam and others directly at-
tacked the AAA as a left-wing conspiracy that deliberately
concealed the "truth" about race. Coon was squarely in
the middle of all this (Jackson 2001), contra the mostly
self-generated (Coon 1981) depictions of him as a purely
objective scientist whose work was misused by others
without his approval (Shipman 1994). As the civil rights
movement became stronger and the Supreme Court
passed desegregation laws (actively resisted in the South),
Coon subtly participated in movements meant to under-
mine Boasian interpretations of race. Coon was sympa-
thetic to the segregationist cause.
Pamphlets and books such as Race and Reason (1962)
by Carleton Putnam (Coon's cousin) used Coon as scien-
tific authority. These publications consciously pitted the
subdisciplines of anthropology against each other, claim-
ing that "scientific" anthropologists (like Coon) rejected
the dismissal of race and that they had evidence of racial
inequality that made blacks undeserving of full citizen-
ship. These writings had wide circulation; they were pub-
lished in newspapers throughout the South, and there was
even a "Putnam Letters Committee" dedicated to raising
funds to publish the letters in Northern newspapers,
where they appeared as paid advertisements and were
used as mass mailings of segregationist propaganda. More-
over, Race and Reason was even required reading in the
Louisiana public schools (Jackson 2001)—evidence of its
prominence in the South.
Attacks from Putnam and other racists like Henry Gar-
rett (1961) and Wesley George (1962) prompted resolu-
tions on race from both the AAA in November 1961 and
the AAPA in 1962. From a press release on the 60th An-
nual Meeting of the AAA, Gordon Willey, then president
of the AAA, called for a resolution in response to "publica-
tions on race and racial differences as a basis for social and
political action" that used "the name 'anthropology' and
'anthropological science' in a way we believe to be false
and misrepresentative of our profession by persons who
are not recognized by the American Anthropological Asso-
ciation as professional anthropologists" Qackson 2001:
263). The resolution passed unanimously.
A few months later, the AAPA passed a resolution in-
troduced by Stanley Garn that specifically condemned
Race and Reason and the misuse of science within it. Fol-
lowing the resolution, Coon resigned from the presidency
of the AAPA, claiming the resolution was inappropriate
and that scientists should keep out of the integration issue
(Coon 1981), even though Coon was very active behind
the scenes of the segregationist cause through his associa-
tion with Putnam and others (Jackson 2001).
Some of the authority segregationists cited also came
from eugenicists whose work (by the 1960s without the
eugenics label) continued to be funded by Wycliffe Draper,
founder of the Pioneer fund, and other like-minded
sources, which today continues to fund research meant to
demonstrate human inequality. This line of research, and
its financial foundation, represents a thread running
throughout the history of U.S. anthropology (Lieberraan
2001) that a few anthropologists have embraced, but that
the community at large has consistently repudiated since
early in the history of the AAA. Just as the AAA refused to
recognize Davenport and Grant as anthropologists in spite
of their influence at the time, both the AAA and the AAPA
have continued to deny anthropological identity to their
intellectual descendents. Like their predecessors, these de-
scendents also claim they are estranged from the field
because of the left-wing, political correctness of anthro-
pologists. They use such political claims to deflect criti-
cism of their work (Relethford 2001). Nevertheless, articles
"demonstrating" racial inequality continue to be pro-
duced and funded by incarnations of the same founda-
tions that supported similar work throughout the century.
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Public attention therefore fostered introspection and
discussion about the validity of race within physical an-
thropology; questions about the intellectual capacities of
different racial groups were addressed, as were questions
of the "reality" of race. Some individuals rejected at least
some elements of the race concept. However, this repudia-
tion of the type concept was more directly influenced by
evolutionary biology; because of evolutionary and genetic
influences, the newer generation of physical anthropolo-
gists grew up thinking about human variation in ways
that were not (at least explicitly) racial.
Genetics, Populations, and Clines
The need to confront public misrepresentations of science
that were actively used in the 1960s fostered alliances be-
tween various elements that had fought racism before
with some that had not—the architects of the modern
synthesis, "mainstream" anthropologists as represented
by the AAA, and physical anthropologists as represented
by the AAPA. The 1966 AAAS Mead-Dobzhansky sympo-
sium represented this alliance, as did a number of volumes
on the study of race produced at the time (e.g., Mead et al.
1968; Montagu 1964) that brought together work from a
variety of disciplines. One way of attacking racism was
(and is) through a focus on the inadequacy of the race
concept for explaining human variation. Studies of clines,
the geographic distribution of individual morphological
and genetic traits, were introduced and population re-
placed race as a focus of study. This was by no means
purely political; it was a consequence of the evolutionary
approach of the new physical anthropology.
As C. Loring Brace pointed out in 1964, races, and
even populations, are inadequate for the study of human
variation. Instead, he advocated for the study of individ-
ual traits—the study of their distribution and the selection
that causes their variation. The study of clines came to re-
place race as a focus of analysis for many researchers.
Frank Livingstone, in his 1962 article on the nonexistence
of human races, eloquently lays out why race or any sub-
specific taxonomy is misleading:
The causes of intraspecific biological variation are differ-
ent from those of interspecific variation and to apply the
term subspecies to any part of such variation is not only
arbitrary or impossible but tends to obscure the explana-
tion of that variation. [1962:279]
He was a strong proponent of nonracial clinal studies, ar-
guing, "there are no races, only clines" (Livingstone 1962:
279).
Others, however (e.g., Brues 1972), accepted the im-
portance of clines but argued that the biology of groups
themselves was also a valid target of inquiry. With the
populational thinking of the modern synthesis, which
formed the basis of Washbum's new physical anthropol-
ogy, populations replaced race as the unit of study. What
did this mean? How did the study of populations differ
from race? Mayr himself suggests that the populational
thinking he developed helped bring about the demise of
the race concept, as essentialism is the antithesis to Dar-
winian approaches to variation. By emphasizing intraspe-
cific evolutionary processes, populational thinking focuses
on variation and the fluidity between populations—on all
the processes that reduce or increase variation within and
between populations. An emphasis on gene flow and its
relationship to other evolutionary forces affecting the dis-
tribution of different traits across populations is what
populational thinking is all about, and it undermined the
race concept. The approach is very different from that
used to understand phyletic evolution, the focus of many
evolutionary scientists, and when populations are studied
with theories and methods appropriate for phyletic analy-
ses, the work is no longer populational, but essentialist.
When these two very different evolutionary domains are
confused with one another, populations are treated much
as races once were, and the work does not represent popu-
lational thinking.
Therefore, despite the shift in focus from race to
population as a unit of study, populational thinking does
not necessarily go hand-in-hand with the study of popula-
tions. Many 20th-century anthropologists, whether study-
ing genes (Boyd 1950) or morphology, conceived of popu-
lation as just another term for race. They thought of
populations as breeding populations, isolated from other
groups. Some recognized this implicitly, some explicitly.
Garn wrote, "the contemporary approach to race stems
from population genetics, where a race is viewed as a
breeding population, neither more nor less" (1962:6). He
identified small "local races" like the "Bushmen" of South
Africa as more or less isolated breeding populations (Garn
1962). In spite of Washburn's (1963) admonition that
races or populations were open systems, populations were
nevertheless conceptualized as closed. Therefore, the exist-
ence of types was implicit, even if the scientific focus was
on their adaptations. As Armelagos, Carlson, and Van Ger-
ven (1982) pointed out, many studies in skeletal biology
and genetics continued to employ typological methods to
typological ends: the recognition and delineation of popu-
lations. Their conclusion in 1982 was that whether using
skeletal or genetic traits, many studies of populations are
just as typological as studies of race.
In spite of the typological approach of some genetic
studies, genetics had a strong influence on the changing
race concept, especially the population genetics of the
modern synthesis. Population geneticists through the
years have provided compelling evidence for human unity.
In 1972, when Richard C. Lewontin made famous the esti-
mates of much more variation within than between hu-
man groups, he was showing what population geneticists
like Dobzhansky had suspected and said all along. While
Dobzhansky argued that races were not a "myth," and
that there were biological differences between popula-
tions, he argued for their fluidity and for the concept of
isolation by distance. More recently, Alan Templeton, a
geneticist with anthropological training writing in the
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pages of AA, looked at race from a genetics perspective,
showing that subspecies do not exist in humans and em-
phasizing that tree models do not adequately describe hu-
man population relationships (Templeton 1998).
However, tree models have continued to thrive. As
discussed earlier, the polygenic tree was such a powerful
metaphor in the thinking of the 1940s and 1950s that
Weidenreich's network was originally interpreted as a tree.
This historic background continues to influence evolu-
tionary thinking about human populations today.
Relationships between populations are still often de-
picted as branches on a tree, therefore implying inter-
populational differences are due to reproductive isolation
from other groups. The magnitude of that difference or
the extent of the relationship is sometimes said to reflect
the length of time since the populations diverged. Al-
though this is appropriate for species (which cannot inter-
breed), and may even somewhat accurately depict inter-
group relationships in species with marked genetic
distinctions between groups, branching models do not de-
scribe human relationships. Ironically, the genetic litera-
ture is full of such representations. Trees are common heu-
ristic devices used to depict variation of genetic systems.
While trees can be valid for representation at this level,
they fail to accurately predict population relations if the
gene divergences are assumed to reflect the relationships
between populations. Worldwide analysis of different ge-
netic systems shows that they have different patterns of
variation—that is, their trees have different patterns of
branching and coalescence. In the same samples, systems
like mtDNA have shallow coalescence times, while others
like beta-globin and HLA have much deeper ones (Hawks
et al. 2000). Because of recombination, the histories of
genes even within the same individual are different. Each
gene tree is different because gene histories are not di-
rectly linked together in population histories (Harding
2000; Hawks et al. 2000; Relethford 1998). Yet, in much of
the genetic literature, a tree derived from a single genetic
system is assumed to represent the history of populations.
CONCLUSION
How did the race concept change in the 1960s? What ele-
ments were altered? Can we really celebrate its demise? Of
the three attributes of race discussed, biological determi-
nism, or racial determinism of such traits as intelligence,
has been most actively addressed since the beginnings of
the AAA, and despite misgivings on the part of some cul-
tural anthropologists, the physical anthropology commu-
nity largely rejects it today. With the growth of evolution-
ary psychology and behavioral ecology, there may be a
resurgence of emphasis on the biological basis of behav-
ioral traits, but, for the most part, these studies recognize
the difference between evolutionary foundations and bio-
logical determinism.
The link between biological determinism and racial
determinism depends on races being natural categories,
and physical anthropologists no longer support the no-
tion that races are subspecies. The importance of gene
flow and the fluidity of the species is recognized even by
forensic anthropologists whose continued use of typologi-
cal and racially charged terms makes them appear less
populational than they often really are. However, in spite
of the rejection of races as subspecies, and a reluctance to
use the term race, populations are often thought of in
much the same way that races were in the earlier litera-
ture. Essentialism continues to influence conceptions
about human groups, and this is exemplified by the use of
trees as metaphors for human population relationships in
studies of morphological and genetic human variation. In-
traspecific clades are an enduring legacy of racial anthro-
pology and continue to inform our thinking about popu-
lations. The race concept may be rejected by anthropology,
but its underlying racial thinking persists. Physical anthro-
pologists no longer study races. Populations are now stud-
ied, but not all approaches to the study of populations are
populational.
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1. Ultimately, race is a taxonomy of people. It categorizes people
based on social factors, even when those factors are believed to
represent "natural categories." Because all taxonomies depend on
essentializing, essentialism is a critical component of racial think-
ing. Today, some argue that essentializing is a product of the hu-
man mind, suggesting racial thinking may have a psychological
component. According to this view, humans create taxonomies of
the biological, social, and physical world in similar ways, cross-
culturally (Atran 1990, 1994; Hirschfeld 1996, 1998). These tax-
onomies are knowledge structures that allow inferences to be made
(beyond the information given) about constituent categories.
Some categories are more inferentially rich than others, allowing
stereotypes to form without empirical basis. These categories have
been termed "natural kinds," because they are believed to be part
of the natural world—"real," not human constructions.
"Natural kinds" are produced through different cognitive mech-
anisms that are specific to particular domains (based on different
mental modules). "Natural kinds" that reflect the biological world
have been termed "living kinds." People learn "living kinds"
through different cognitive processes than those used to learn
about inanimate things or the processes that relate to them.
Hirschfeld (1996, 1998) and others have argued that, in addition to
a cognitive domain that governs "living kinds/' humans have a
separate domain that allows them to easily learn "human kinds"
and the complete set of traits that make up the essence of a particular
kind. These "human kinds" are social categories that are particularly
important to a culture; they are thought by members of that cul-
ture to be intrinsic to a person's identity. Just as biological catego-
ries carry information about the essence of a species (or a dog
breed), "human kinds" carry information about the essence of a
type of person—what they are supposed to look like, think like,
and act like. The fact that many members of a category do not con-
form to the stereotype does not dispel the stereotype. "Human
kinds" are groups whose members are believed to share some funda-
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mental essence. Because classifications of "human kinds" are con-
sidered fundamental reflections of identity, they may have greater
social meaning than other categories that do not reflect the es-
sence of a person. In U.S. society, presumed geographic origin and
phenotypic features, widely considered the constituent compo-
nents of race, are considered to be more intrinsic to identity than
other categories like occupation or religion. Therefore, in Western
society, and globally to some extent because of cultural intercon-
nection, Western dominance, and the legacies of colonialism,
"race" is a "human kind" and, therefore, has a psychological di-
mension since it is based on the same cognitive domain. According
to this reasoning, we may be psychologically disposed to racial
thinking. This suggests, as Hirschfeld (1996) has said, that racial
thinking and the race concept are not one and the same; the race
concept may be a product of "mentation," but racial thinking is
cultural and psychological.
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